Promotional Trademark Licensing: A Concept Whose Time Has Come by Keating, W.J.
Volume 89 
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 89, 
1984-1985 
1-1-1985 
Promotional Trademark Licensing: A Concept Whose Time Has 
Come 
W.J. Keating 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
W.J. Keating, Promotional Trademark Licensing: A Concept Whose Time Has Come, 89 DICK. L. REV. 363 
(1985). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol89/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
Promotional Trademark Licensing: A
Concept Whose Time Has Come
W. J. Keating*
I. Introduction
"an established name is an estate in tenure, or a throne in
possession . . .'
Trademark rights do not exist in gross but exist only in conjunc-
tion with the goods or services with which they are associated.2 A
corollary of this black letter rule is that a trademark owner who li-
censes his trademark must delineate a standard of quality for the
products or services ("products") bearing the licensor's mark.3 He is
also required to police the trademark licensee's products to assure
consumers that the licensed products meet the quality standards
specified by the trademark owner.4 Failure to do so may invalidate
the trademark.5
A substantial line of commerce has developed in which the con-
sumer is more interested in identification with the trademark owner
than in the quality of the goods bearing the trademark. Common
examples include caps, shirts, beach towels, drinking glasses and
other items bearing the names or emblems of institutions, schools
and sports teams. This commercial activity might properly be enti-
tled "Promotional Trademark Licensing."
A growing number of courts recognize the right of the institu-
tion owning the trademark to control and license it without requiring
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law. B.S. 1947, Canisius College; J.D.
1954, Georgetown University.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Ms. Vicki D. O'Connor for her assistance
in the preparation of this article.
1. Edgar Allan Poe, "Letter to Mr. B_ ," POEMS, Preface (1831).
2. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 68 (2d ed. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as MCCARTHY].
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c). This section provides for cancellation of a trademark registra-
tion if "the registered mark is being used by, or with permission of, the registrant (of the
mark) so as to misrepresent the source of the goods or services." See infra note 18.
4. Dawn Donut v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 368 (2d Cir. 1959).
5. Id.
the quality assurance function. 6 While the trend exists, it is ham-
pered by trademark law which requires that the trademark owner
must prove "confusion" 7 (or a "likelihood" of confusion) on the part
of the purchasing public to enforce its rights.
This article will examine the contrast between consumer moti-
vation as it affects promotional trademark licensing and traditional
product/service trademark licensing. It will also discuss the concept
of trademarks as property and the rights and obligations of trade-
mark owners to control the merchandising of products bearing the
trademark. It will suggest why promotional trademark licensing
should be treated differently from classifical trademark licensing. It
will also discuss the elements of "confusion" necessary to sustain a
cause of action for infringement of promotional trademarks.
II. Trademark Rights Rely on Association with Business
It is a well-accepted premise of trademark law that a trademark
has no existence apart from the good will it represents.8 It logically
follows that transfer of trademark rights can only occur in conjunc-
tion with transfer of the business or a segment of the business involv-
ing the trademark products.'
A major explosion of trademark licensing occurred in the devel-
opment of franchise marketing, a system based on non-exclusive,
multiple trademark licenses.10 This merchandising vehicle became
popular after World War II and in 1982 accounted for $339 billion
or 31 percent of merchandising in the United States."
The franchisor is required to adopt standards of quality control
6. In University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc., 686 F.2d 1040 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982), the Court of Appeals recognized this new and
expanding area of the law. Id. at 1046, n.18. Also, in Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n. v.
Dallas Cap and Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1011 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
868 (1975), the court recognized its own deviation from traditional concepts of trademark law.
"[Olur decision here may slightly tilt the trademark laws from the purpose of protecting the
public to the protection of the business interests of plaintiffs .. ." See also MCCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 18:2. Professor McCarthy condemns a broad anti-assignment in-gross rule as
containing a danger of "degenerating into a sterile formalism." Id. at 800.
7. The original statute required that "purchasers be confused as to the source of ori-
gin of such goods." The statute was amended in 1962 to broaden the scope so that any confu-
sion caused by defendant's trademark usage that would injure the plaintiff would subject the
user to liability. Act of October 10, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat. 769.
See also Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n. v. Dallas Cap and Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d
1004, 1012 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
8. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:1 at 793, refers to the association between the
trademark and the business as "inseparable as Siamese twins."
9. MCCARTHY, supra note I, § 18:1(c) at 794.
10. Id. § 18:22.
II. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, "Franchising in the Economy", 1981-1983 survey. In
1982 franchising claimed one-third of every retail sales dollar in the United States. Rathbun,
The Franchising, Nation's Business, March 1982, at 82. The Commerce Department has pre-
dicted that a host of opportunities will open for the franchise entrepreneur with the increased
demand for business services. Id.
and impose them on the franchise. 2 This is consistent with the re-
quirement that the franchisor police the franchisee's quality control
to protect the quality assurance function of the trademark. Requir-
ing the franchisee to maintain a designated quality standard prevents
fraud upon consumers who expect the product bearing the trade-
mark to have the same quality level as that found in products of the
franchisor and other franchisees. The franchise agreement must re-
quire the franchisee to meet these standards.13 Failure to meet the
standards could lead to cancellation of the franchise.14 The
franchisor has a concomitant duty to inspect the franchisee on a reg-
ular basis to insure that the standards are being met.' 5
Ironically, the trademark owner is under no duty to impose
standards of quality control on products of his own manufacture.' 6
Courts generally look to the marketplace to reward (or punish) the
trademark owner by assigning a commercial value to the quality
level of the product bearing the trademark. 17 When the right has
been assigned or licensed, however, a substantial product change
may constitute fraud and result in forfeiture of trademark even if the
change improves the quality of the goods.'"
The early history of trademark licensing in franchise agree-
ments is one of abuse. Franchises were sold with glowing promises of
financial rewards, premised upon continued assistance to the fran-
chisee. Such assistance was in fact illusory. The franchisor, having
received an initial investment from the franchisee, continued to ex-
tract royalties, the only consideration being the "naked" trademark
license. Such arrangements were judicially condemned as trademark
abuse.' 9 Quality standards among various franchisees lacked uni-
formity and consumers, relying on the quality assurance attribute of
the trademark, were cheated. The courts emphasized that a
franchisor's failure to maintain a pre-determined standard of quality
invalidated the trademark license.20
III. Promotional Trademark Licensing
For many years the emblems and insignia of various institu-
12. See infra note 13.
13. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 18:14(A).
14. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Shelley Knitting Mills, Inc., 268 F.2d 569 (3d Cir.
1959).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055 & 1127. See Dawn Donut Co., v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267
F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
16. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 6-7 et seq. (1984) [hereinafter
cited as GILSON].
17. Id.
18. Id. §§ 6-6 & 6-7 and cases cited therein.
19. Phillip Morris v. Imperial Tobacco Co., 251 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Va. 1965), affd,
401 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1968). See also GILSON, supra note 14, § 6.01(4).
20. GILSON, supra note 14, § 6.01(b) and cases cited therein.
tions, schools and sporting teams have been used on novelty items by
manufacturers who were not licensed to do so and paid no royalty to
the institution. Recently, the University of Pittsburgh brought suit
against a manufacturer who had used the University logotype on va-
rious novelty items over a period of forty-five years without receiving
permission or paying a royalty.2 The Court of Appeals held that
laches was not a good defense to future trademark infringement but
refused to award back damages.
22
A major impediment to enforcement of an institution's trade-
mark rights against a manufacturer of novelty items is the classical
test of trademark infringement. 2 The test involves comparison of the
marks and comparison of the goods of the two parties in order to
determine similarity.24 In the University of Pittsburgh case, although
the marks were identical, the goods were quite dissimilar. Courts re-
fused to believe that consumers would conclude that a prestigious
university was the manufacturer of ash trays (or drinking glasses,
sweatshirts, etc.).25
One of the earliest cases upholding the rights of institutions to
control the destiny of their emblems was Boston Professional Hock-
ey Association, Inc. v. Dallas Cap and Emblem Manufacturing.26
The facts are relatively simple. The Boston Bruins Hockey Club
(along with fourteen other major league hockey teams) licensed its
trademark, consisting of a block letter "B", to the Lion Brothers
Company for use on clothing and other promotional items. Under
the exclusive agreement, Lion Brothers Company was the only quali-
fied manufacturer allowed to make and sell items bearing the trade-
mark. Lion paid a royalty to Boston Hockey for this right. The roy-
alty was based on the gross sales of products bearing the trademark.
Dallas Cap and Emblem requested permission to duplicate the
emblem signifying the Boston Hockey team. Boston Hockey refused
on the basis of the prior exclusive license issued to Lion Brothers.
Dallas Cap nevertheless proceeded to manufacture and sell emblems
which were substantial duplicates of the Boston Bruins' trademark.
Boston Hockey brought suit for trademark infringement, 27 false des-
ignation of origin2 8 and common-law unfair competition.29
21. University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1045 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982).
22. Id. at 1045.
23. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1963).
25. University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1047 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982).
26. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
27. This action was brought under 15 U.S.C. § 1114.
28. This action was brought under 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
29. "Unfair competition" is a generic expression to characterize all statutory and non-
statutory causes of action arising out of unfair commercial or business dealing. American Her-
The threshold question involved the application of the Lanham
Act 3° to a situation in which the products of the infringer are quite
different from the products sold by the trademark owner. The test of
applicability of the statute is whether or not confusion would result
from the defendant's use of the mark on its goods.
3
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The lower court concluded that the stylized letter "B" was
merely ornamental and not a proper subject for trademark protec-
tion.32 To the extent that confusion of source might result, the lower
court sought to prevent this confusion by requiring the defendant to
identify properly the product as not approved by Boston Hockey.33
The Court of Appeals held that the remedy was inadequate to
protect the rights of the Boston Bruins.34 While acknowledging that
Boston had a protectable property right in the trademark, the Court
attempted to justify protection on the basis of the five classifical ele-
ments of trademark infringement. Finding the first three elements -
duplication of the plaintiff's mark by the defendant, without the
plaintiff's consent, in interstate commerce - was easy.
The fourth element requires that the infringing use of the regis-
tered mark occur in connection with the sale of goods. The court was
baffled by the fact that the defendant was not selling goods but was
selling copies of the trademark. Traditionally, if a substantially simi-
lar trademark is attached to substantially similar products, infringe-
ment occurs. When the defendant is selling the equivalent of the
plaintiff's label for consumers to sew on clothing, however, infringe-
ment by the defendant is less clear. The court held that "[w]hen the
defendant causes plaintiff's marks to be embroidered upon emblems
which it later markets, defendant uses those marks in connection
with the sale of goods as surely as if defendant had embroidered the
marks upon knit caps."'35 While the court could have found the de-
itage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 14 (5th Cir. 1974).
30. The Lanham Act governs the infringement of federally registered trademarks. 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1963).
31. The statute requires that the plaintiff show "the use is likely to cause confusion."
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1963).
32. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n. v. Dallas Cap and Emblem Mfg., 360 F. Supp.
459, 464 (N.D. Texas 1973). The court found the plaintiff's emblems were functional. See
infra notes 71-96 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the right of the trademark owner must
give way to the public policy favoring free competition.
33. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n. v. Dallas Cap and Emblem Mfg., Inc., 360 F.
Supp. at 465.
34. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n. v. Dallas Cap and Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d
1004, 1013 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). A subsequent decision by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals approved the District Court's finding of $40,000 in actual dam-
ages. It disallowed an award of $66,000 representing a proposed license fee of $33,000 which
the District Court doubled to punish the defendant for bad faith. The Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that the award was clearly erroneous. Attorney's fees were denied by the District
Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n. v. Dallas Cap
and Emblem Mfg., Inc., 597 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1979).
35. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004,
fendants liable on the basis of contributory infringement by the de-
fendants, 36 it chose instead to consider the emblems as the goods and
the embroidered design on the emblem as the trademark.
The fifth element of a trademark cause of action requires that
the infringing use is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake
or to deceive. . . .-37 The court stated that finding confusion by con-
sumers of emblems was "conceptually difficult".38 The court con-
cluded that "[t]he certain knowledge of the buyer that the source
and origin of trademark symbols were in plaintiffs satisfies the re-
quirement of this act."' 9 At best, the decision seems to say that since
trademark infringement occurred, there must have been confusion.
One of the teams joined as a party plaintiff, the Toronto Maple
Leafs, had not registered its trademark and therefore was not eligi-
ble to allege trademark infringement.4" It prevailed, however, under
section 1125 of the statute.41 Under that section, any false descrip-
tion of goods sold in interstate commerce provides a cause of action
by a plaintiff who "believes he is likely to be damaged" by such false
description.4 The court found that sale of the emblems by the defen-
dant constituted a false implication that the Toronto team sponsored
the emblems. 43 Sales by unlicensed sources competed with sales by
licensees of the hockey teams from which the teams received a
royalty.
In Boston Professional Hockey Association v. Reliable Knitting
Works,44 under a similar fact situation, the court found, on a motion
for preliminary injunction, that "for purposes of this motion, the
court is convinced that said use by defendant was likely to cause
1011 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); See also Boston Professional Hockey
Ass'n. v. Reliable Knitting Works, Inc., 178 USPQ 274 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
36. "Contributory infringement" involves situations in which the defendant has not
committed an essential element of the cause of action but has inspired others to commit it, in
which case the defendant is considered equally liable. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Labo-
ratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1963).
38. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n. v. Dallas Cap and Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d at
1012. If one concludes that consumers expected the emblems to be manufactured or sponsored
by the Boston Hockey team when this was not the case, the necessary element of confusion is
present. The Court of Appeals held that knowledge of consumers relating to origin and source
of the symbol from the plaintiff was a recognition of expansion of the term "confusion", intro-
duced into the Lanham Act by the 1962 amendment. See supra note 6.
39. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n. v. Dallas Cap and Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d at
1012.
40. Under 15 U.S.C. § I I14(a), remedies are available to the owner of "a registered
mark".
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 forbids false designations of origin and false descriptions. The
court found that in the Toronto case the "defendant used a symbol, Toronto's mark, which
tended falsely to represent goods, the embroidered emblems, in commerce." 510 F.2d at 1012.
Because the consuming public had certain knowledge that the source and origin of the symbol
was in the Toronto team, the defendant's reproduction violated § 1125.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1963).
43. See supra note 40.
44. 178 USPQ 274 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
confusion ... ,,4 The court did not explain the basis for this
finding.
IV. Trademarks as Property
Not all courts adopt the rationale of Boston Hockey v. Dallas
Cap and Emblem because the concept of enforcing a trademark
right, sans association with goods or services, is difficult for many
courts to accept.46
Approaching the problem from the other end, many courts do
not appreciate that trademarks constitute personal property, 47 albeit
intangible personal property. Starting from this focal point, the ac-
tion of the defendant in usurping the plaintiff's property should con-
stitute a cause of action without the necessity of proving confusion of
purchasers or actual damages. If one misappropriates another's auto-
mobile, the owner has a right to have the property (the car) re-
turned. The right to quiet enjoyment of the property is assumed,
without a necessity of proving actual damage.
48
Accordingly, the right to quiet enjoyment of the trademark
should be extended the same protection. The misappropriation of the
Boston Bruins emblem by Dallas Cap should afford the plaintiff the
right to preclude continued misappropriation. Even the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, felt
compelled to justify the traditional elements of trademark infringe-
ment to uphold the plaintiff's rights.49
V. Protection of Business Rights in Promotional Trademark
Licensing
The conservative view of restricting trademark protection to the
prohibition of using similar marks on similar goods has been amelio-
rated by the decision in Boston Hockey v. Dallas Cap and Emblem
and its progeny, as well as by amendment of the Trademark Act. As
45. Id. at 278. Plaintiff, Boston Hockey, motioned for a preliminary injunction and the
court held that "[for the purposes of this motion, the Court is convinced that said use by
defendant was likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake or to deceive." Id.
46. In Steinway and Sons v. Robert Demars and Friends, 210 USPQ 954 (C.D. Calif.
1981), the court went to the ridiculous extreme of holding that the defendant's beer can han-
dles sold under the trademark "Stein-way" were likely to confuse the public into believing that
the goods came from the same source as the famous "Steinway" pianos. The only rational
explanation for finding similarity of such disparate products is the court's desire to protect the
Steinway piano reputation from use on trivial promotional goods. If tne court had found that
Steinway was entitled to protection against promotional trademark usage, such an extreme
position would not have been necessary. See also infra text accompanying note 93.
47. See e.g., Mishawaka Rubber and Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S.
203 (1942).
48. JOSEPH J. DARLINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 4
(1891).
49. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n. v. Dallas Cap and Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
originally enacted, the Lanham Act defined trademark infringement
in terms of precluding the use of similar marks on similar goods or
services, in a manner which was likely to cause confusion to
consumers.
In 1962, the Act was amended to expand the scope of infringe-
ment to a prohibition of using similar marks on goods that might
result in any type of confusion, mistake or deception.5" The expan-
sion of the language of the Act was intended to protect the "busi-
ness" of the trademark owner, as well as the reputation of the trade-
mark owner as the implied source of origin of the goods.
A. The "Business" of the Educational Institution
The basic "service" of the University of Pittsburgh is to provide
a high quality education to its students. Can we say that the "busi-
ness" of the University is of the same scope? I think not.
The business of the University embraces a number of collateral
services that support the University's ability to provide a high quali-
ty of educational services. The business of the University involves
attracting a student body willing to pay tuition to achieve this educa-
tional level. It involves attracting a faculty willing to associate itself
with the educational level. It involves maintaining a reputation that
will attract supporters, alumni, community and friends, willing to de-
clare themselves in sympathy with the goals of the University. This
is the "business" of the University as much as Proctor & Gamble's
business is the sale of soap.
Admitting that the business of the University includes the im-
age it strives to create, renders the emblem, name and other insignia
of the school protectable personal property, to the same extent that
IBM has the right to protect its trademark in furtherance of its
business. 5
B. The Role of Promotional Trademarks in Accomplishing the
Objectives of the Educational Institution
The operation of a University requires that it seek sources of
funds to achieve its goal. Student tuition is an obvious source. In
view of the rising costs of college education, schools seek all the ad-
ditional help available in meeting these costs.
Alumni donations are a fertile field. Government aid is wel-
come. A royalty on the sale of articles bearing the school emblem
gives loyal supporters an opportunity to assist in underwriting the
school's expenses. Comparing the potential for such a royalty to ben-
50. See supra note 6.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 52-53.
efit school programs with the right of private individuals to pocket
the entire profit from the sale of such artifacts, the equities seem to
favor the former.
C. The Role of Promotional Trademarks in Accomplishing the
Objectives of Non-Profit Institutions, Other than Educational
Institutions
The justification for protecting trademarks of educational insti-
tutions also applies to non-profit professional, religious and fraternal
groups. Most of these groups are involved in fund-raising campaigns
to defray program expenses. Organizations should have the right to
obtain all proceeds from the sale of items bearing their trademarks.
Exclusive trademark protection also gives them a certain control over
membership drives, as well as protection against fraudulent or unsa-
vory use of the trademark.5"
D. The Role of Promotional Trademarks in Accomplishing the
Objectives of the Commercial Enterprise Operated for Profit
What about commercial logotypes as promotional trademarks?
Should IBM be able to restrain the use of its logotype on beach tow-
els? If one again addresses the "business" of the corporation as the
protectable entity, the right of the commercial corporation to license
its logotype for a royalty payment is even more compelling.
The business of a commercial corporation is to maximize profits
in all legitimate ways. If the logotype's use on beach towels or T-
shirts has commercial appeal, the company that generated that com-
mercial appeal should have a stake in the reward. It should also be
permitted to manage the licensing of the logotype to achieve maxi-
mum profits. Furthermore, it should have the right to refuse to grant
a license in situations where such use is inimical to the image the
trademark owner considers desirable.
5 3
VI. Consumer Perceptions in Promotional Licensing
Does this mean that the traditional concept of trademark pro-
tection for use on goods/services should be discarded? Hardly.
Trademark licensing denoting the trademark owner as the
source of goods relies on consumer perception. If the court perceives
52. Ball v. American Trial Lawyers Ass'n., 14 Cal. App.3d 289, 92 Cal. Rptr. 228
(1971).
53. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D. N.Y. 1972),
wherein the defendant's substitution of the word "Cocaine" for "Coca-Cola" in a poster simu-
lating the Coca-Cola trademark was held to infringe plaintiff's trademark to the detriment of
its business reputation. See also Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,
604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
that consumers purchase goods because consumers look to the trade-
mark as an indicia of quality assurance (e.g., McDonald's hamburg-
ers), then the traditional concept of similarity of marks and similar-
ity of goods should be preserved as the test of infringement.54
If, however, the court perceives that consumers purchase goods
to display their loyalty and support of the trademark's owner (e.g.,
the Boston Bruins) then use of the mark by an interloper should be
treated as unjustified misappropriation of personal property and fur-
ther use should be enjoined. Evidence of consumer perception is a
question of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Such evi-
dence as consumer testimony, survey evidence and expert testimony
may be considered, if relevant, as in any other case involving factual
determinations.
In classical trademark usage, a consumer is motivated to
purchase a product bearing a trademark because of the consumer's
expectation that the product will meet the quality standards that the
trademark owner achieves. In "Promotional Trademark Merchandis-
ing", the purchaser is not motivated by the quality level of the prod-
uct, but rather wishes to identify with the trademark owner. 55 The
trademark proclaims the exhibitor's loyalty, admiration or sympathy
with the organization represented by the trademark (the "LAS" fac-
tor). While University of Pittsburgh supporters do not expect beach
towels bearing its trademark to be manufactured by the University,56
they do expect that the University will benefit from sale of the towel
in some financial way.57 A recent survey indicated that 45.3 percent
of the respondents believed that companies making jerseys corre-
sponding to National Football League jerseys were required to ob-
tain authorization from the-NFL.58 Common sense tells us that sup-
porters of the University of Pittsburgh who spend money on articles
containing the institution's trademarks would be more readily moti-
vated to purchase a souvenir if they were under the impression that
some of the purchase price of the product went to the University
than they would be if they knew that all revenue went to the manu-
facturer of the product, who is neither associated with nor licensed
by the University. This expectation on the part of consumers should
be sufficient to fulfill the requirement of the "likely to cause confu-
sion" element necessary to support a cause of action for trademark
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1963).
55. See University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1047 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982) ("The entire impetus for the sale is the consumer's
desire to identify with Pittsburgh").
56. Id. The court stated, "No one would seriously assert that a significant segment of
the public believes that Pitt actually manufactured the goods involved."
57. National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F.
Supp. 651, 658-59 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
58. Id. at 659.
infringement.59
In considering trademark infringement as applied to Promo-
tional Trademark transactions, when consumers purchase goods to
identify with the trademark owner, sale of an unlicensed item bear-
ing the trademark should constitute infringement. The first prong of
the test, similarity of the plaintiff's and defendant's trademarks, is
easy. Usually the marks are identical since the defendant wishes to
satisfy consumer desire for an authentic-looking trademark.
The second prong of the test is more difficult, especially where
the trademark owner does not sell or license products of a similar
nature. The University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products0 court
had trouble finding similarity of goods when the University was op-
erating an educational institution and providing entertainment ser-
vices in fielding a football team. The services provided by the Uni-
versity were a far cry from the shirts, caps, ties, etc., marketed by
the defendant.
If promotional trademarks are recognized as symbols of institu-
tional loyalty, admiration or sympathy, rather than focusing on the
utilitarian aspects of defendants' products, the necessity of functional
similarity of goods is eliminated. The defendant has misappropriated
the thing of value created by the plaintiff, i.e., the "LAS" factor.
On remand in University of Pittsburgh,"1 the district Court de-
plored the lack of survey evidence in support of the University's con-
tention that consumers assumed products bearing the University of
Pittsburgh logotype were associated with the University. An article
in the Duquesne Law Review62 stated that a consumer survey
presented in one case6 3 cost over one-half million dollars to prepare.
It seems like an exhorbitant burden to place on the plaintiff to prove
a fact which is virtually subject to judicial notice.
VII. The British Situation
In Great Britain, "Character Merchandising" is prohibited by
statute.64 The activity involves promotion of an invented name and/
or depiction of a character. The proprietor of the goods using the
name also licenses the use of the name to merchants not associated
with the proprietor for use on their goods."5
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1963).
60. 686 F.2d 1040 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982).
61. 566 F. Supp. 711, 714 (W.D. Pa 1983).
62. Comment, Trademarks: Protection of Merchandising Properties in Professional
Sports, 21 DuQ. L. REV. 927, 961 (1982-83).
63. National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651
(W.D. Wash. 1982).
64. Trade Marks Act of 1938, § 28(b).
65. Holly Hobbie Trade Mark, (1984] 19 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. 329.
A recent case involved the mark "Holly Hobby", developed by
the American Greetings Corporation for a fanciful character repre-
senting a young girl. 6 American Greeting Card Company entered
into trademark license agreements with other companies for a wide
variety of merchandise. When American Greetings attempted to reg-
ister the trademark in Great Britain by relying on use of its licensees
as related companies," registration was refused on the basis that the
licensing activity was prohibited by Section 29(1)(b) of the Act. 8
The assistant registrar held that such licensing activity constituted
"trafficking" in the mark, since the mark itself constituted a source
of income rather than identifying the source of a class of goods. The
High Court and the Court of Appeal affirmed.
69
Lord Bridge, in a concurring opinion, 70 concluded that the doc-
trine of "trafficking" as applied to character merchandising was a
complete anachronism that should be repealed. He conceded it may
have been justified in 1938, when the act was passed, to prevent the
public from being deceived as to the source or origin of goods. Under
current merchandising practices, however, failure to protect charac-
ter merchandising permits trademark pirates to trade on valuable
property rights developed and promoted by the originator of the
character.
Recognizing the realities of the marketplace, Lord Bridge noted
that purchasers of articles of clothing bearing a likeness of the char-
acter do not expect the proprietor of the mark to certify the quality
of the clothing. Thus purchasers are not deceived. Consumers are
interested only in acquiring a product associated with the character.
Because of the clear language of the British Trademark Act forbid-
ding such trademark licensing activity, however, the Court held the
license was unlawful in Great Britain. The Court recognized the in-
equity in refusing to protect "character" trademark licensing but
concluded the inequity could only be corrected by amendment of the
Trademark Act.
Fortunately, the United States Law does not specifically forbid
"character" (or "promotional") licensing,71 but merely requires that
66. Id.
67. A "related company" refers to any entity legitimately controlled by a trademark
owner. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1963). Trademark usage by a subsidiary or licensee develops trade-
mark rights in the parent or licensor.
68. Supra note 63.
69. Id.
70. Holly Hobbie Trade Mark, [1984] 19 R.P.D. & T.M. Cas. at 351. Referring to §
28(b) of the Trade Mark Act of 1938, Lord Bridge stated, "I do not pause to express my
opinion that it has become a complete anachronism and that the sooner it is repealed the
better." Id.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 states that the cancellation of the registration of a U.S. trade-
mark may be effected if the "mark is being used by or with the permission of the registrant so
as to misrepresent the source of the goods or services in connection with which the mark is
the licensor not mislead the public as to the source of goods.72
VIII. The Ornamental Trademark: Emblems v. Jewelry
The jury is still out on the question of whether the sale of a
"configuration of goods" trademark, having ornamental properties,
can be exclusively controlled by the trademark owner. The problem
is exemplified by sale of jewelry in the shape of a trademark or bear-
ing the trademark emblem.
In the case of In re Penthouse,73 the Court of Customs and Pat-
ent Appeals (now the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) held
that the right of the trademark owner to protect its well-known
trademark, simulating the shape of a skeleton key, extended to jew-
elry. The Patent and Trademark Office had refused to register the
Penthouse trademark for a gold key suspended from a chain on the
ground that it was primarily ornamental, rather than indicating
source of the goods.74 A collateral concern was that such registration
would give Penthouse a monopoly on jewelry in the shape of a key,
which, if protectable, is governed by the copyright statute.75
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed the Patent
and Trademark Office on the basis that the particular shape of the
key was recognized as identifying products from Penthouse.76 In the
court's opinion it was immaterial whether the shape of the key was
printed on the product label or depicted three-dimensionally in the
shape of the device.77
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit came
to the opposite conclusion in the case of International Order of Job's
Daughters v. Lindebury & Company.78 In that case the plaintiff was
a sorority which had adopted an emblem signifying membership.
The trademark was duly registered. Job's Daughters licensed a jew-
elry manufacturer as the exclusive licensee under the trademark to
make and sell jewelry bearing the trademark emblem.
The defendant produced and sold competitive jewelry without
permission from Job's Daughters or its licensee. Suit followed and
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded the motivation of the
purchaser was to acquire an aesthetically pleasing product rather
used .. " As indicated supra note 55, promotional licensing does not mislead consumers as
to the source of the goods.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1963).
73. Application of Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 565 F.2d 679 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
74. Id. at 680.
75. Id. at 681, 683.
76. Supra note 71.
77. Penthouse, 565 F.2d at 683. Here the court held, "The capacity of a mark to indi-
cate origin is not destroyed because the mark appears as a charm on a bracelet, instead of as a
symbol on the box which contains the bracelet."
78. 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981).
than a product emanating from the trademark owner. 9 The Court
held that because of this consumer motivation, the shape of the jew-
elry did not indicate source of goods to the consumers and was there-
fore not protectable as a trademark.
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The decision of the Ninth Circuit in Job's Daughters was some-
what vindicated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Supreme
Assembly Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J. H. Ray Jewelry Com-
pany.81 The Rainbow Girls case was quite similar to Job's Daugh-
ters in that a sorority brought suit against a jewelry manufacturer
for selling decorative jewelry bearing the sorority's emblem. The
Fifth Circuit retreated from its previous position in Boston Hockey
v. Dallas Cap and Emblem 2 and held that no trademark infringe-
ment existed. The Court characterized the plaintiff's failure to pre-
vail as "a simple failure of proof."'8 3 The Court explained, "In this
case Appellants simply failed to prove that there was any likelihood
of confusion." '84 The holding is somewhat suspect in view of the hold-
ing in Boston Hockey v. Dallas Cap and Emblem that:
The confusion or deceit requirement is met by the fact that
the defendant duplicated the protected trademarks and sold
them to the public knowing that the public would identify them
as being the teams' trademarks. The certain knowledge of the
buyer that the source and origin of the trademark symbols were
in plaintiffs satisfies the requirement of the act. 85
The Fifth Circuit in Rainbow Girls attempts to distinguish Boston
Hockey v. Dallas Cap and Emblem on the basis that knowledge of
the symbols' source is not always equated with confusion. 6 It sug-
gests consumer perception in the sorority jewelry market may be dif-
ferent from the emblem market "the appellants had failed to prove
the Rainbow emblem operates as a trademark when used as a design
for jewelry.187 It held that these findings of fact by the District
Court were not clearly erroneous.
Since the purchasers of Rainbow Girl jewelry intend it to sig-
nify membership in the Order of Rainbow for Girls, it is difficult to
accept the District Court's finding that the Rainbow emblem on jew-
79. Id. at 918, 920.
80. Id.
81. 676 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1982).
82. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
The court in Rainbow Girls stated, "Boston Hockey does not always equate knowledge of
a symbol's source in the confusion sufficient to establish trademark infringement." 676 F.2d at
1085.
83. Rainbow Girls, 676 F.2d at 1082.
84. Id. at 1083.
85. 510 F.2d at 1012.
86. 676 F.2d at 1085.
87. 676 F.2d at 1083, n.5.
elry does not constitute Rainbow's trademark.8
The Fifth Circuit in Rainbow Girls made a brief allusion to the
doctrine of "functionality" in trademark cases. 89 Briefly, the doctrine
holds that the trade dress or the configuration of a product, which
consumers recognize as identifying the source of the product, cannot
be protected as a trademark if the design is primarily functional."0
The rationale of the doctrine is that such protection would be the
equivalent of granting a perpetual monopoly on functional features.
Such features, if protectable at all, should be tested under the re-
quirements of the patent statute.91
Attempts to distinguish Boston Hockey v. Dallas Cap and Em-
blem from Rainbow Girls have spawned a wide diversity of opinion.
Professor McCarthy seems to approve the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals Rainbow Girls decision over its previous decision in Boston
Hockey v. Dallas Cap and Emblem.9" An equally distinguished au-
thor and practitioner in the trademark field, Jerome Gilson, Es-
quire, 93 characterized the Rainbow Girls decision in the following
manner:
The same court (5th CCA) nimbly, but unconvincingly dis-
tinguished Dallas Cap in a case involving a registered collective
mark on jewelry. It found that, despite its Dallas Cap rationale,
although the public recognized the mark as that of the organiza-
tion, it was nevertheless not likely to be confused. Supreme As-
sembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co.94
Judge Cohill's statement in the University of Pittsburgh v. Cham-
pion decision, on remand, is more blunt: "We do not think Boston
Hockey [v. Dallas Cap and Emblem] is good law."195 He concludes
that the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rainbow
Girls is a retreat from its previous holding in Boston Hockey.9"
Regardless of the diversity of opinion interpreting these deci-
sions, there may be a logical distinction between cases involving jew-
88. The court should have considered the consumer motivation and what has previously
been referred to as the "LAS" factor. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
89. 676 F.2d at 1083, n.5.
90. See e.g., Compro Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roe-
buck Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
91. A collateral doctrine has arisen, referred to as "aesthetic functionality". When the
trademark subject matter consists of design features which are primarily ornamental, it should
not be protected by the trademark law but should be subject to the requirements of the copy-
right statute. Supra note 88. The courts in both Rainbow Girls and Job's Daughters used the
aesthetic functionality doctrine to defeat trademark protection.
92. McCarthy, supra note 1, at 954.
93. Gilson, supra note 15 (Jan. 1984 Cumulative Supplement 122).
94. Id.
95. University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 719 (W.D.
Pa. 1983). A notice of appeal was filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
The appeal was subsequently withdrawn in view of an out-of-court settlement.
96. Id.
elry in the shape of a trademark and cases involving emblems bear-
ing a trademark. In the former, the jewelry has intrinsic, ornamental
value. A diamond pin is a valuable item having an intrinsic worth
apart from its representation as identifying the wearer as a member
of a fraternal order. Attempts to restrict the market to a single
source constitute a restraint of trade, contrary to public policy.
On the other hand, emblems have little intrinsic value apart
from identifying the wearer as supporting the organization repre-
sented by the symbol. Since it does not constitute a separate product,
apart from its trademark existence, it does not constitute a relevant
market for a distinct line of commerce. The only value created by
the emblem is its association with the trademark owner.
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IX. Conclusion
The requirement that a trademark licensor police the quality-
control of the licensee may have served consumers well in the early
days of franchising. It may still serve consumers well in marketing
practices in which consumers rely on the trademark as an indication
of quality.
In promotional trademark licensing, however, the consumer is
merely interested in attaining a symbol to display loyalty, affection
or sympathy to a person, institution or cause and the quality-control
function has no substantial value in the marketing practice. To re-
quire the owner of the trademark to inaugurate an imaginary quali-
ty-control program to satisfy legal requirements, constructed by
courts in dissimilar situations, is to elevate form over substance. The
trademark owner is subject to unnecessary expense without any real
benefit to consumers. The only beneficiary is the trademark in-
fringer, who is in a position to challenge the validity of the mark on
the technicality that the quality control-program is inadequate.
The Lanham Act does not specifically forbid trademark licens-
ing without quality-control. It merely prohibits using the trademark
in a fashion which misrepresents source of the goods. In promotional
trademark licensing, failure of the licensor to maintain quality-con-
trol of the product by the licensee does not constitute such a misrep-
resentation. As noted above, in this type of marketing the consumer
does not expect a preordained quality level. The consumer motiva-
tion to purchase the product is the purchaser's desire to associate
97. In Schroeder v. Lotito, 577 F. Supp. 708 (D. R.I. 1983), the court protected a
union label as a colorable limitation of the plaintiffs symbol. The court held that the false
impression created was that the goods originated from a union shop and that they were pro-
duced by employees affiliated with organized labor. Even though the mark was not an exact
copy it gave rise to a claim.
with the trademark owner. 98
The statutory requirement that the defendant's use of the mark
on goods must cause confusion, mistake or deception to support a
charge of trademark infringement is easily satisfied within the con-
fines of the statute. The confusion or mistake need not necessarily
relate to the source of the product. Any confusion or mistake arising
from the consumer's misconception that the trademark owner bene-
fits from or endorses the sale of the product should be sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the statute. Such an interpretation would
preclude the necessity of finding that grand-pianos are similar to
beer can handles in order to protect a well-known trademark.99
It is interesting to note that souvenir manufacturers pay a roy-
alty for trademark use to professional sports teams but not to col-
leges. It would seem that educational institutions would have a
stronger equitable claim to such revenues. A sensible interpretation
of the Lanham Act, recognizing current marketing practices in pro-
motional trademark licensing, would restore the equities in the
marketplace.
98. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 45.

